Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcripts Flight 3407
Below is the transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder during the last 5 minutes of Flight 3407.
Click here for the full transcript:
22:09:15.9
PA-3
ladies and gentlemen in preparation for landing in Buffalo please be
certain your seatback is straight up and your seatbelt is fastened. please
pass any remaining service items and unwanted reading materials to us
as we pass through the cabin. please turn off all portable electronic
devices and stow them until we have reached the gate. after landing
Continental Connection allows passengers to use cell phones. I will make
an announcement when it is safe to use this device. if you plan to use
your cell phone please ensure it’s accessible since personal items must
be stowed until we reach the gate.
22:09:17.8
HOT-1
four thousand alt sel.
22:09:18.8
HOT-2
four thousand.
22:09:26.0
HOT-1
how’s the ears?
22:09:27.3
HOT-2
uh they’re stuffy.
22:09:31.6
HOT-1
are they poppin?
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22:09:32.7
HOT-2
yeah.
22:09:33.3
HOT-1
okay. that’s a good thing.
22:09:35.7
HOT-2
yeah I wanta make em pop. [sound of laughter]
22:10:22.6
HOT-2
is that ice on our windshield?
22:10:25.6
HOT-1
got it on my side. you don’t have yours?
22:10:28.7
HOT-1
* [sound of whistle]
22:10:30.5
CAM
[sound of click]
22:10:32.3
HOT-2
oh yeah oh it’s lots of ice.
22:10:47.5
HOT-1
oh yeah that’s the most I’ve seen— most ice I’ve seen on the leading
edges in a long time. in a while anyway I should say.
22:10:51.4
HOT-2
oh *.
22:10:57.7
HOT-2
yeah that’s another thing. all the guys— @ came in to our when we
interviewed and he said oh yeah you’ll all be upgraded in six months into
the Saab and blah ba blah ba blah and I’m thinking you know what. flying
in the northeast I’ve sixteen hundred hours. all of that in Phoenix how
much time do you think actual I had or any in in ice. I had more actual
time on my first day of IOE than I did in the sixteen hundred hours I had
when I came here.
22:11:21.0
HOT-1
[sound of laughter]
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22:11:22.2
HOT-2
I’m not even kidding. the first day.
22:11:25.7
HOT-1
well that sounds— well I mean I didn’t have sixteen hundred hours.
22:11:27.5
HOT
[sound similar to altitude alert]
22:11:28.9
HOT-1
five for four alt sel.
22:11:29.8
HOT-2
five four alt sel.
22:11:31.5
HOT-1
but uh as a matter of fact I got hired with about six hundred and twenty
five hours here.
22:11:37.6
HOT-2
oh wow.
22:11:39.4
HOT-1
uh.
22:11:39.9
HOT-2
that’s not much for uh back when you got hired.
22:11:42.5
HOT-1
no but uh out of that six and a quarter two hundred fifty hours was uh part
one twenty one turbine. multi engine turbine.
22:11:50.0
HOT-2
oh that’s right yeah.
22:11:54.3
HOT-2
no but all these guys are complaining they’re saying you know how we
were supposed to upgrade by now and they’re complaining I’m thinking
you know what? I really wouldn’t mind going through a a winter in the
northeast before I have to upgrade to captain.
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22:12:04.0
HOT-1
no no.
22:12:05.0
HOT-2
I’ve never seen icing conditions. I’ve never deiced. I’ve never seen any—
I’ve never experienced any of that. I don’t want to have to experience that
and make those kinds of calls. you know I’dve freaked out. I’dve have like
seen this much ice and thought oh my gosh we were going to crash.
22:12:17.7
APP
Colgan thirty four oh seven descend and maintain two thousand
three hundred.
22:12:21.8
RDO-2
okay down to two thousand three hundred Colgan thirty four zero
seven.
22:12:25.1
HOT-2
um two three alt sel.
22:12:27.4
HOT-2
I’ve got you in pitch pitch hold. I don’t know if that’s what you want.
22:12:27.6
HOT-1
two three alt sel.
22:12:29.6
HOT-1
yeah that’s alright. let’s uh— we’ll do vertical speed back.
22:12:33.3
HOT-2
but I’m glad to have seen oh— you know now I’m so much more
comfortable with it all.
22:12:37.6
HOT-1
yeah uh I I spent the first three months in uh Charleston West Virginia and
uh flew—.
22:12:43.5
APP
Colgan thirty four zero seven turn left heading three three zero.
22:12:47.0
RDO-2
left heading three three zero Colgan thirty four zero seven.
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22:12:49.3
HOT-1
left three three zerooo. we’re in heading mode now. go to blue needles.
22:13:01.2
HOT-1
but I— first couple of times I saw the amount of ice that that Saab would
would pick up and keep on truckin’.
22:13:05.9
HOT-2
yeah.
22:13:08.0
HOT-1
saw it out on the spinner. ice comin’ out about that far my eyes about that
big around. I’m going gosh. I mean Florida man— barely a little you know
out of Pensacola.
22:13:09.3
HOT-2
yeah.
22:13:14.2
HOT-2
holy cow…oh my gosh…oh yeah.
22:13:18.0
HOT
[sound similar to altitude alert]
22:13:21.4
HOT-1
that’s uh thirty three for twenty three alt sel.
22:13:24.1
HOT-2
thirty three for twenty three alt sel.
22:13:24.8
HOT-1
let’s do a descent checklist please.
22:13:25.9
HOT-2
do a descent checklist. altimeters two niner eight zero set crosschecked.
22:13:29.1
HOT-1
twenty nine eighty set crosschecked.
22:13:30.8
HOT-2
fuel balance check. pressurization set and cabin PA complete. descent
checklist complete.
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22:13:35.7
HOT-1
alright if you want to go ahead we can do the approach checklist along
with it.
22:13:37.4
HOT-2
yeah sure. um approach checklist approach and landing brief complete.
22:13:41.6
HOT-1
uh complete.
22:13:42.3
HOT-2
bugs set.
22:13:43.3
HOT-1
set.
22:13:44.3
HOT-2
GPWS landing flaps selected fifteen degrees. fuel transfer off hydraulic
pressure and quantity check. caution warning lights check seatbelt sign
on and external lights on. approach checklist complete.
22:13:54.7
HOT-1
rock and roll.
22:13:58.4
HOT-1
oh yeah— I’m so glad. I would’ve— I w— I mean—. I would’ve been been
fine. I would have survived it. there wasn’t— we n— never had to make
decisions that I wouldn’t have been able to make but…now I’m more
comfortable.
22:14:08.5
APP
Colgan thirty four zero seven turn left heading three one zero.
22:14:12.1
RDO-2
left heading three one zero for Colgan thirty four zero seven.
22:14:12.7
CAM
[sound similar to engine power increase]
22:14:14.6
HOT-1
three one zero.
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22:14:16.6
HOT-2
yeah.
22:14:22.6
HOT-1
alright let’s see if I can get this seat…siteated…that’s alright there.
22:14:24.7
CAM
[sound similar to seat track movement]
22:14:32.7
HOT-1
still trying to find that sweet spot I guess there *.
22:14:39.8
CAM
[sound similar to engine power increase]
22:15:06.3
HOT-1
flaps five.
22:15:08.1
HOT-2
what?
22:15:08.8
HOT-1
flaps five please.
22:15:10.0
HOT-2
oh *.
22:15:11.2
CAM
[sound similar to flap handle movement]
22:15:13.5
APP
Colgan thirty four zero seven three miles from KLUMP turn left
heading two six zero maintain two thousand three hundred until
established localizer. cleared ILS approach runway two three.
22:15:22.2
RDO-2
left two sixty two thousand three hundred ’til established and
cleared ILS two three approach Colgan thirty four zero seven.
22:15:31.7
HOT-1
alright approach is armed.
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22:15:32.8
HOT-2
roger.
22:15:59.5
CAM
[sound similar to decrease in engine power]
22:16:04.1
HOT-1
gear down…loc’s alive.
22:16:06.2
CAM
[sound similar to landing gear handle movement]
22:16:06.4
APP
Colgan thirty four zero seven contact tower one two zero point five.
have a good night.
22:16:07.4
CAM
[sound similar to landing gear deployment]
22:16:11.5
RDO-2
over to tower you do the same thirty four zero seven.
22:16:14.9
HOT
[sound of two double chimes]
22:16:21.2
HOT-2
gear’s down.
22:16:23.5
HOT-1
flaps fifteen before landing checklist.
22:16:26.0
CAM
[sound similar to flap handle movement]
22:16:26.6
HOT-2
uhhh.
22:16:27.4
CAM
[sound similar to stick shaker lasting 6.7 seconds]
22:16:27.7
HOT
[sound similar to autopilot disconnect horn repeats until end of recording]
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22:16:27.9
CAM
[sound of click]
22:16:31.1
CAM
[sound similar to increase in engine power]
22:16:34.8
HOT-1
Jesus Christ.
22:16:35.4
CAM
[sound similar to stick shaker lasting until end of recording]
22:16:37.1
HOT-2
I put the flaps up.
22:16:40.2
CAM
[sound of two clicks]
22:16:42.2
HOT-1
[sound of grunt] *ther bear.
22:16:45.8
HOT-2
should the gear up?
22:16:46.8
HOT-1
gear up oh #.
22:16:50.1
CAM
[increase in ambient noise]
22:16:51.9
HOT-1
we’re down.
22:16:51.9
CAM
[sound of thump]
22:16:52.0
HOT-2
we’re [sound of scream]
Those were two lousy pilots.
Every pilot -from private on up – knows that in a landing descent you NEVER retract the flaps from any down position – much less 15 degrees of flaps.
The ONLY exception is if you are executing a missed approach, or during a touch and go.
They should have recognized the icing far sooner.
The decrease in airspeed that resulted was further aggravated by flap and landing gear extension, even though by then they had realized excess icing accumulation (which also indicated de-icing systems were not activated) prior to entering a known icing condition.
From the cockpit banter (which during a landing approach is a no-no) it is clear that crew coordination was totallly absent.
Add to that seat adjustment – just like in an automobile – should have been accomplished prior to this critical (approach to landing) phase of the flight.
And finally, it is apparent they fought the stick shaker
(meaning the crew failed to lower the nose of the aircraft to regain airflow – and lift – from the wings)
In Summary:
Proper simulator / procedural training of the SAAB aircraft in known icing conditions is obviously not effective.
Basic Pilot aircraft control (i.e. stall recovery) was totally absent on behalf of both pilots
Crew Discipline (basic premise: FLY THE AIRPLANE) was disrupted due to unecessary chat during critical landing phase.
The blatant disregard for the passengers who trusted the crew for their safety should be a heads-up for all commercial carriers to review and enfore the crew safety and pilot certification programs.
Remedial training for Airline Captains (and First Officers) who fail checkrides should be mandatory, and the privilages should be suspended until the criteria for Pilot and First Officer check rides are met – before allowing the crew to return to duty.
Nick I agree with you %100, but unfortunately the FAA has a rather poor equation when it comes to airline saftey.
Money > Lives
The FAA is not the problem. The entire system should be privatized. You’ll get better people and better results when its out of the governments hands. Its a shame these 2 rookie pilots killed those passengers. the FAA has allowed pilots to be paid nearly nothing to feed an ultra competitive airline enconomy. those pilots make less than the hotel van driver. Cab drivers who can barely speak english make more in 2 fares than a comuter pilot makes all day long yet the pilots have to be highly trained and evaluated. This girl first officer made the critical error with the flaps. This is some thing a seasoned pilot would never do but she was allowed to enter the job with minimal time and experience. The FAA, like TSA is very far from a perfect system. When we want to travel for nearly nothing, costs and corners are cut and shaved off. the cost savings is tragic.
God bless their souls, rest in peace to the passengers.
Don’t touch the flaps until the (unwatched) ASI is back in the green. And the (unwatched) ASI undoubtedly was reminding them of the cardinal rule that must be obeyed on an approach to landing: “Maintain thy airspeed or the ground will rise up and smite thee.”
Add Power, Pull Gear, but don’t touch those flaps until you have recovered from the stalled condition!
Humans revert back to their training during times of stress. Unfortunately, the FO (and CA) didn’t have much to fall back on. Sad.
Nick- you said it best- NEVER retract the flaps during approach to landing -especially when ice is present. (A good hour of ground school on icing & aerodynamics would have helped.)
Not to mention, they should have had more thorough simulator training. Maybe then the captain would have realized his aircraft was trying to save him. Why would this not be included? Put the simulator in a stall and see how it & the pilot react. Supposedly the stick-shaker part was left out of the standard training protocol. Probably to save time and money of course.
Let’s mention the de-icing systems while we’re at it. Supposedly they were turned on shortly after take off, but were they actually working? How many aircraft have we flown with faulty equipment because we had to?
BTW- Did anyone notice from the reports that the First Officer had more hours logged in make/model than her Captain?
I feel bad these folks had to end their flight careers this way. They should have made it to retirement to fly old Cubs and such out of some grass field somewhere.
If they keep this up, only the decent pilots will be left… down side is they will take out a ton of passengers in the mean time…
Eveyone step back from your microscopes and take a look around. There are 3 words to explain why this tragedy ocurred – LACK OF EXPERIENCE!
Par for the course for regionals, which is why my family will only fly mainline.
No offense to the regional pilots. Like I said, it’s about experience and also training – not ability.
The companies are to blame with their relidiculous low-time requirements.
The Colgan 3407 tragedy is the unfortunate result of a relatively simple equation.
A highly sophisticated aircraft flown by highly inexperienced pilots who are paid less than the airport limo drivers flying passengers who are not willing to pay more than $99 for a flight to Buffalo but will easily spend $50 plus a tip for the cab to the airport.
My condolences to all those families who have lost a loved one. Unfortunately, until this equation changes, the results will continue.
Also, North America is one of the only places in the world where a pilot can obtain an “Airline Transport License” having never set foot in a transport category aircraft, let alone flown within a cloud or in icing conditions. The First Officer highlights this very fact on the tapes. So are the regulators also responsible? Will they learn from this experience? Will things change?
Lets hope so.
Pete and Trash Haulin…
There’s a very bif difference between “Lack of Experience” and Poor Decision Making. These pilots both had lots of experience flying many different aircraft. What killed them and the pax was their lack of discipline, poor training, and chit-chat. They had experience…but experience doesn’t say anything about ability.
As for the ATP rating, one has to have 1500 hours to be eligible.
FAA in Bed witht eh airlines to provide cheap pilots, in addition, the EEOC pushes for females and minorities in the cockpit lower the flt hours and training requirements. Pay pilots what they are worth and pass along the costs as operational costs.
- The FAA is not the problem. The entire system should be privatized. You’ll get better people and better results when its out of the governments hands.
Yeah, cuz big corporations care about people’s safety and not money. Hell the FAA is essentially a corporation now for all it cares about safety.
I say let the NTSB set policy instead of merely recommending it. You’d get much better regulations if the people who are forced to see these horrors up close are the ones making the rules.
Nick my friend, Never say Never. If it was an icing induced tailplane stall the first two things you should do are reduce power and retract flaps. Additionally, when a tailplane stalls (versus the wing) you want to pull up (fight the shaker/pusher). NASA researchers have recovered from such a stall in a DHC-6 (smaller airplane, same manufacturer) with an altitude loss of only about 300ft. Was it a tailplane stall? I don’t know, the accident had many tell tale characteristics of one. My point is, until the NTSB investigation is complete, we will not know if the crew reacted correctly or not.
On the point of experience, it is a generalization that regional pilots have little experience. Many regional Captains have experience of well over 10,000 hours. It must be conceded however that some regional copilots are hired with as few as 300 hours. A little research will show that pilots with much higher levels of experience have made mistakes that have killed many more people. Not justification, just facts.
How about we (especially those who are not professional pilots) quit judging. Respect the memory of those lost and keep the back seat flying to yourself. The NTSB will handle the placement of responsibility. For the sake of the crew, I hope they did their best and did it right. Regardless……God Rest Your Souls
Mark
I agree with your comments the FAA hopefully will find an answer.
I hold Aust ATPL with over 8000 hrs until we have been put
into this situation and survived we don’t know what we would do,
with more experience we may have not got into this situation in the first place.
The University of Hindsight is a great thing.
May god rest all there sole including the Flight crew and we pray that this tragedy
Never happens again
Nick Distrola got it right in every conclusion that i personally came to. and anytime you look back and see 1/4 to 1/2 inch of rime ice on your leading edges – and you don’t get a pucker factor of at least 5.0 – you should never go into the sky except as a passenger.